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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
dedicated. There is no place in this heroic mission for personal
glorification. Indeed, there is never a place in our national
life for personal glorification by the degradation of others.
I am confident that we shall successfully complete this
undertaking. But we must do it with the instruments and in
the spirit of our democracy - not with the techniques of
dictators or tyrants. We must meet and defeat the aggressions
of Communism without violating our own principles or tra-
ditions. And we must serve this high purpose with truth and
justice, with fairness and decency.
Abe Fortas
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SAFEGUARDS FOR WITNESSES:
PROPOSED REMEDIAL LEGISLATION:
PROTECTION FOR WITNESSES IN
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
My assigned part in this discussion of congressional investi-
gations concerns the extent to which the two Houses of
Congress can and should take steps to meet the criticisms of
the investigative process for themselves. This puts me some-
what in the position of describing the cat in the famous con-
ference of mice where the solution ultimately agreed upon
was a good loud bell. Of course it is not fair to describe the
relationship between congressional committees and their wit-
nesses as a perfect analogy to the feud between cats and mice.
But I do believe that the problem we are talking about centers
in Congress itself, and nowhere else. And I think it would be
a mistake to turn toward any power outside the legislative
branch for a solution.
It goes without saying that I do not ratify or condone any
abuses that may have been described to you in this sympos-
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ium. As a matter of fact, we who are serving in Congress are
probably more sensitive than anyone else to the bad public
reactions stirred up by a few of our committees, whether
justifiably or not. Most of us will readily admit that there
have at times been abuses which need correction. Unquestion-
ably witnesses who testify are in need of definite protection
and vindication of their rights.
But there is another side of the coin to be kept in view:
Congress also has important rights in the investigative pro-
cess. This is what makes me tend to be very conservative
about imposing external limitations on the work of congres-
sional committees. It is my belief that Congress has both the
plenary power and the ranifeS will to clear up this situation
by its own action.
All the lawmaking authority vested in Congress channels
through only five words in the Constitution: Article I, Section
1, refers to "All legislative Powers herein granted," which
are conferred without limitation on the legislative arm of
the Government. From these words the investigative power
has been developed by interpretation and implication, and I
think the rationale underlying it is perfectly sound. The
power to legislate necessarily implies the power to inquire. No
lawmaking body could discharge its obligations wisely with-
out free access to facts about the subjects it is called upon to
consider.
Furthermore, under the great principle of separation of
powers, our federal legislature is responsible for keeping a
watchdog eye on the way existing laws are being administered
by the executive arm. In this latter capacity, also, it seems
imperative that Congress should be able to conduct inquiries
without limitation. When things go wrong in the vast ma-
chinery of our Government, it is up to the legislators, who are
the only directly elected spokesmen for the people, to step in
and call for a full accounting. Indeed, this symposium is post-
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ulated on the thesis that the investigating power of Congress
is essentialto the proper functioning of our government.
So the problem is not at all to hobble the investigating
committee or curtail its functions. What must be worked out
is a delicate balance between the implied but substantial
rights of Congress on the one hand, and the rights of in-
dividuals, on the other.
I
But before examining this balance, which is largely a mat-
ter of give and take in the realm of procedure, let me stress
one guide which I think the lawmakers themselves must
always keep in view: the rights of Congress are no broader
than the legitimate objects from which they have been im-
plied. And I believe those objects are only the two referred to
a moment ago: (1) to gather facts about proposed legislation,
and (2) to inquire into the workings of existing federal laws.
There lies the first and perhaps the only important sub-
stantive restraint which Congress must impose upon itself.
No congressional investigation is justified unless it can be
directly related to the lawmaking process in one of these
ways. In other fields, investigations are proper and often
necessary, but not by Congress.
It follows that I disagree strongly with those who argue
that Congress is also responsible for informing and educating
the public by looking into anything which may happen to
catch the popular fancy of the moment. This notion accounts
for much of the sensationalism which has surrounded a few
of our congressional investigations. Mere headline making,
per se, should be left strictly to newsmen and to public agen-
cies charged with the detection of wrongdoing and the
prosecution of individual offenders. To restate this cardinal
rule of self-restraint: congressional committees should never
intervene in the first place except where new federal legisla-
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tion may be required, or where the working of some existing
federal law is involved.
To digress slightly, I think it is proper to note here a per-
fectly honest reason for the tendencies toward headline seek-
ing which are sometimes related to this activity. Anyone who
is holding an elective office must keep "alive" in the eyes of
his constituents. That is simply a fact of political life. In the
last few decades, as the sessions of Congress have grown
longer and longer and the routine work in Washington has
increased many fold, it has become increasingly difficult for
legislators to get away from the Capitol and to go home to
take care of their political "fence-mending."
A conscientious Senator or Representative sometimes finds
himself buried for weeks and months at a time, doing the
plain hard work expected of him. He risks being forgotten,
for the public fails to realize how important the day-to-day
problems of running the Government really are. One alterna-
tive to this honorable oblivion - and its grave political risks
- is to gain national recognition in the news media, in con-
nection with a popular investigation. I am not defending the
tactic as such, but I think it is a significant part of the total
problem we are talking about.
Beyond a need for self-restraint in choosing the subject
matter of investigations at the outset," I submit that Congress
should have an unlimited fact finding power, supported by
such aids as the subpoena, compulsory testimony under oath,
ancillary arrest,2 and contempt processes.3
1 The authorizing resolution is all-important in this respect. It should be clear,
and should give the precise limits of the authority it confers. See United States v.
Rumley, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
2 Persons ignoring subpoenas are subject to apprehension by the sergeants at
arms of the two houses, but these officers can only invoke the aid of other federal
agencies when authorized to do so by special resolution. See, S. REs. 65, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951). A bill to permit such aid in all cases died in the 82d Congress and
has not been reintroduced. S. 2058, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
3 For a proposed improvement in the enforcement processes available to com-
mittees, see note 16 infra and accompanying text.
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The rights on the other side, the rights of individuals when
they are called upon to give information to a congressional
committee, are the main focal point of this discussion, and my
principal subject matter. This is where I think the cat should
be encouraged, and can be expected, to bell itself.
In each of the last three Congresses I have sponsored a
resolution before 1e House of Representatives which would
establish rules of procedure to be observed by all House in-
vestigating committees.4 During the recent Department of
Justice investigation, which was launched under the chair-
manship of my esteemed colleague Representative Chelf, of
Kentucky, whom I succeeded as Chairman, we developed and
tested a full set of formal rules for the conduct of our hear-
ings. At present, a singularly able subcommittee of the House
Committee on Rules, under the chairmanship of Representa-
tive Hugh Scott, of Pennsylvania, is addressing itself to the
preparation of uniform rules for our committees. The subject
has been of major interest and concern to me for a long time,
and I think it can be fairly reported that many of my col-
leagues are as anxious as I to do something constructive about
it, and soon.
In this paper I am going to touch on some of the problems
and principles that should be considered in developing a good
set of rules for the protection of witnesses, rather than offer
you my own specific proposals or others which have been
developed to date.5 Congress has unlimited rule-making
power with respect to the activities of its own committees,
and this, as I have noted, is where the solutions to our prob-
lems should be sought.
4 H.R. 571, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H. R. 27, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H. RES. 29, 83 Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
5 See S. CON. RES. 10, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; S. RES. 83, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953) ; H.R. 4123, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). Special Committee of the Bar
Association of the District of Columbia, Rules of Procedure for Congressional Hear-
ings, 20 J. BAR Ass'nv D.C. 354 (1953).
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Rules, as the word implies, are determinants of procedure
rather than substance. The great safeguards which exist
under our system of government for the benefit of individuals
are clearly set forth in the Constitution and its interpretation
by the courts. They need nothing added; what we must do is
simply to make them work in this context, though I do not
think it can be too strongly emphasized that procedure is
fully as important as substance here. To be effective, the
principles enumerated hereafter must be reduced to precise,
understandable, working statements, with the t's crossed and
the i's dotted, so that both the witness and his interrogators
will know the specific rights of each. The principles I consider
most important are the following:
1. Majority control over the subject of each hearing.
I have already observed that, in my view, no investigation
should be authorized by Congress unless it is directly related
to the lawmaking process. I see no way, however, of formally
restricting the decisions of Congress as to the subject matter
of investigations, beyond exhorting self-restraint. But once
an investigation has been authorized there is much leeway as
to the course it will take, and here I think the principle of
majority control should be firmly laid down. Logically the
chairman should have the authority to direct the staff in pre-
liminary studies and exploration, but before any phase of an
investigation is brought to the hearing stage it should be sub-
mitted to the committee and formally approved by a majority.
Along this same line, it is my opinion that other important
decisions - apart from the selection of subject matter -
should also be made by the committee rather than by the
chairman or any individual member. Power delegated to in-
vestigating committees is almost always conferred on a bal-
anced bipartisan group; no single member should ever be
allowed to usurp it.
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2. Clear public announcements of the subject to be
considered in each phase of the investigation.
Although I think it is deceptive always to equate congres-
sional hearings with judicial proceedings, some of the analo-
gies are close and helpful. In the matter of notice, for instance,
witnesses and their counsel - as well as the committee -
should be informed in advance, as they are by the pleadings
in a law suit, as to the issues to which each inquiry is address-
ed. Failing this, some of the other protections become
meaningless; no respect can be accorded the principle of
germaneness, witnesses are exposed to the dangers of trickery
and surprise, and the functions of counsel are apt to be
seriously impaired.
3. Majority control over the use of executive hearings.
The committee's power to close its doors and take testi-
mony in secret session is quite proper. Indeed, fair dealing
often clearly dictates such a course. Thus witnesses can be
encouraged to- testify more freely, and persons who might
otherwise be unfairly injured can be accorded protection. But
the executive hearing is susceptible of abuse as an out-and-out
Star Chamber process, to break the witness down and to fish
for weaknesses which are later exploited in an open hearing.
I do not think it would be practical to place absolute limits
on the use of closed sessions; the situations in which they may
be legitimately required are too varied. But in every instance
they should be held only after a responsible decision by a
majority of the committee.
4. Secrecy measures with respect to executive hearings.
The value of closed sessions is lost, of course, if their
secrecy is not protected. Therefore, the rules should formalize
such matters as the exclusion of unauthorized persons from
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
the hearing rooms, public statements by witnesses, counsel
and other persons who are present, and the release of proceed-
ings by the chairman or any individual committee member
without majority approval. It should perhaps also be provided
that if the testimony on any subject matter is released in part,
the witness or witnesses concerned shall have the right to
reveal other pertinent parts, or the testimony in toto.
5. The right of witnesses to be advised by counsel.
This is an issue on which the analogy to courtroom pro-
ceedings has caused confusion. There are no clearly adversary
parties in a congressional hearing, and counsel's traditional
role as protector is somewhat out of place. It is noteworthy
that no formal right to counsel has ever been accorded wit-
nesses before legislative bodies; they are admitted to hearings
as a matter of grace. Nonetheless, I believe the prevailing
practice should be recognized and that every person called
upon to testify should have the absolute right to be accom-
panied by counsel of his own choosing.' This would apply to
executive as well as open hearings, except in the rare case
where the attorney is himself the subject of investigation in
the same proceeding.
The rules should lay down a basic standard of conduct and
decorum,7 to permit the committee to deal with special prob-
lems such as contentious "mouthpieces" and the occasional
witness who merely parrots the promptings of his attorney.
Experiments with permitting counsel to examine his own
6 D.C. Bar Committee, supra note 5, at 355-6 recommends that persons inter-
viewed by staff investigators should also be accorded a formal right to counsel and
permitted to rely on counsel at this stage. I am inclined to think the suggestion goes
too far; investigators have no formal rogatory rights, no power to administer oaths,
etc.
7 Since counsellors are almost always attorneys at law (though there is no such
formal requirement), it might suffice to refer in this connection to the applicable
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, e.g., Canons 15, 16,
22, 26, 32.
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client briefly, and to cross-examine other witnesses, orally or
by written interrogatories, might well be undertaken although
I am inclined to think that Congress is not yet prepared to go
so far as to permit oral cross-examination.
6. The right of witnesses to submit prepared statements.
Every person who testifies should have an opportunity to
offer a concise statement during the course of his interroga-
tion. Subsequent statements in clarification or rebuttal should
also be permitted. This rule would have to be so framed as to
preserve some control in the committee on such matters as
brevity, relevancy, etc. Probably such statements should be
required to be submitted in writing, in advance of their pre-
sentation for the record.
7. Protection of non-witnesses discreditably referred to.
Persons adversely characterized in congressional hearings
present a special problem. In most cases, there is no forum
except the hearing room where they can make adequate
answer. I believe that, subject to reasonable standards of
brevity and relevancy, such persons8 should be permitted:
(a) to submit a statement for incorporation in the com-
mittee's record;
(b) to appear and testify before the committee; and
(c) to confront or interrogate their accusers, by written
interrogatories or otherwise.
8. The right to call additional witnesses.
Under certain circumstances either a witness or an injured
non-witness may be required, in fairness to himself, to bring
s The test of adverse characterization should be definitely spelled out, based,
perhaps, on actionable libel or direct accusations of crime. It is noteworthy that mere
disgrace or infamy is excluded by statute as a ground for refusal to testify before
a congressional body. REv. STAT. § 103 (1875), as amended, 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2
U.S.C. § 193 (1946). Quaere, whether an analogous limitation would be too re-
strictive in this context.
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the testimony of other persons to the attention of the com-
mittee. Here the analogy to the accused in a courtroom is
somewhat tenuous, yet worthy of consideration. With ade-
quate safeguards to prevent abuses, such a right should be
available whenever the need for it is satisfactorily demon-
strated to the committee.
9. All oral testimony to be given under oath.
This is a small point which should be clarified. If the rule
is formally established it will apply to all alike, avoiding.
occasional embarrassments which are presently encountered.'
10. Availability of stenographic transcripts.
This, too, is a small matter which should be formalized.
Every witness should be given the unqualified right to exam-
ine transcripts of testimony given by him, as well as the right
to purchase copies if he has testified in public or if the testi-
mony he has given in an executive hearing is released."
Since the need for considerable flexibility - as contrasted
with uncertainty - in such rules is obvious, discretion might
be reserved in the committee, acting through a majority, to
waive or modify any provision upon a finding that no hard-
ship would result therefrom, or in the alternative, the rules
should contain a general exhortation to liberal construction
and fair and just application in all cases."
II
Now in conclusion I shall allude briefly to several related
matters that I believe should be included in any full con-
sideration of this subject.
9 The power to administer oaths is formally vested in committee members by
statute. REv. STAT. § 101 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 191 (1946).
1o It might be also wise to provide that all testimony taken under oath shall be
transcribed, or must be transcribed if the witness so requests. This is universal
practice but conceivably it could be dispensed with in some situations where the
witness would be seriously prejudiced by its omission.
11 Exemplary are Fan. R. Civ. P. 1, FED. R. Cmr. P. 2.
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The first of these is the question of newsreel, radio and
television coverage of congressional hearings. It is a whole-
some thing, in my view, for the public to have direct contact
with the work of Congress. I do not share the conservative
view that cameras and microphones should be excluded en-
tirely from all committee proceedings. On the other hand,
coverage in these new media raises serious problems: the
equipment which is required, especially the brilliant illumina-
tion for photography and television, tends to harass the wit-
ness and to disrupt the committee's work; coverage is usually
partial, since the hearings cannot be timed for the cameraman
or the broadcasting companies' commitments and, therefore,
what the public receives is generally fragmentary and some-
times misleading; and the presence of sensitive microphones
has occasionally destroyed the privacy of communication be-
tween the witness and his counsel.
I am in favor of further experimenting with these media,
and believe that eventually their use will have to be governed
by additional rules of general application. 2 For the time be-
ing, I think it should be provided that when hearings are to
be broadcast or televised, coverage will be permitted only
with the understanding that any witness who declines to
appear via these media shall be excused.
Another related problem, but one which must be met by
legislation rather than by rule-making, is the extent of the
immunity, if any, to be accorded witnesses who plead self-
incrimination. Although Congress has had an immunity
statute in force for over half a century,13 the courts long ago
construed it to be virtually worthless.14 At present, therefore,
there is no way for a congressional committee to overcome
12 For an interesting attempt to draft rules governing TV broadcasting, see,
Final Report of the Senate Crime Committee, SEN. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 99-103 (1951).
13 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. 1952).
14 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (voiding a materially identical
statute). See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 335-42 (1950).
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the plea of privilege on this ground. This plea has been
frequently interposed in bad faith, thereby abusing the Bill of
Rights. Legislation is now pending to revise the statute so
that it would be effective.' 5
In its present, form, this new measure provides that im-
munity can be conferred only with approval of a majority of
the committee, and only after notice to the Attorney General.
I am very much in favor of these limitations, but I would go
even further. The dangers of automatic immunity are self-
evident; in every case where such a statute is invoked there
is, in effect, a bargain in which the inquiring authority excuses
some crime in return for testimony which could not otherwise
be elicited. I think we must be very careful that Congress
never enters such bargains lightly, and that in every case the
prosecuting arm of Government, through the Attorney Gen-
eral, is advised of what the legislative arm proposes to do.
Indeed, I would prefer to vest the authority to grant immun-
ity with the Attorney General, who has the correlative re-
sponsibility for law enforcement.'5 a At the very least, I would
give him a veto power over possibly arbitrary or capricious
action by a congressional committee.
Finally, I should like to direct your attention to a proposal
which I am sponsoring in the present Congress,"0 to give con-
gressional committees direct recourse to the courts in enforc-
ing their rogatory powers. This is a device which has been
used successfully by a number of administrative agencies.
When a witness defies the committee by refusing to respond
15 S. 16, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), now pending before the House Judiciary
Committee. See report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Immunity of
Witnesses Appearing Before Congressional Committees, SEN€. REP. No. 153, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
1 5 a H. R. 6899 recently introduced by the author, 100 CoNG. REc. 19 (Jan. 6,
1954) embodies this proposal and has received the endorsement of the Attoriney Gen-
eral. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1954, p. 6, col. 3. [Editor's note.]
16 H.R. 4975, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
17 See Rules applicable to FTC, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1946);
NLRB, 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (Supp. 1952); SEC,
49 STAT. 831-2 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(d) (1946).
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to a subpoena or to give evidence, instead of the present
cumbersome procedure which requires a resolution-citation
for contempt and subsequent punishment under a criminal
statute,"8 the committee would apply forthwith to a court.
The court order would then be enforced by the court's own
contempt powers.
From the committee's viewpoint, this change would make
it possible to compel the production of evidence, which is
what is desired and needed, instead of merely inflicting a
delayed punishment for the witness' recalcitrance. From the
witness's viewpoint, it would permit the removal of contested
issues promptly from the hearing room to the impartial
atmosphere of a court. If the witness happened to be right in
his defiance, he would be promptly and finally vindicated.
In presenting the point of view to which I have adhered in
this paper, I wish to make it absolutely clear that I am
implying no criticism of the colleagues with whom I have
been identified in the conduct of congressional investigations.
My criticisms are general; my personal experiences have
been entirely gratifying.
In summary, I believe that the investigative functions of
congressional committees can be satisfactorily improved by
the use of Congress' own rule-making powers; I do not think
the courts should interfere extensively with these functions,
and I would look for considerable reluctance from the judicial
arm if it were called upon to do so. The picture is encouraging,
however, for Congress is giving serious attention to this very
matter, and I am sure that constructive results will soon be
forthcoming.
Kenneth B. Keating
18 REV. STAT. §§ 102, 104 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (1946).
